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Evaluating the Multifarious Motives for Acquiring Goods and Services from the 
Informal Sector in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
The aim of this paper is to evaluate which consumers in Central and Eastern Europe are more 
likely to acquire goods and services from the informal economy and to unravel their 
multifarious motives for doing so. Analysing 11,131 face-to-face interviews conducted in 11 
Central and Eastern European countries in 2013, a logit regression analysis reveals that some 
groups purchase from the informal economy to obtain a lower price, others for social or 
redistributive rationales, and yet others due to the failures of the formal economy in terms of 
the availability, speed and quality of provision. The implications for theorising and tackling the 
informal economy are then explored. 
 
Keywords: informal economy; undeclared work; consumer behaviour; consumption; Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
 
Introduction 
 
In the last few years, considerable advances have been made in unravelling the multifarious 
character of the informal sector across Central and Eastern Europe (Morris and Polese 2014, 
2015; Polese 2014, 2016; Williams et al. 2013). Until now, however, these studies have 
largely focused upon those working in informal sector, analysing the diverse array of types of 
work conducted, ranging from exploitative waged employment through well-paid forms of 
self-employment to paid favours (Williams 2014, 2015a,b), the multifarious demographic and 
socio-economic characteristics of informal workers and businesses (Davies and Polese 2015; 
Kukk and Staehr 2014; Likic-Brboric et al. 2013; Lukiyanova 2015; Putni৆ã and Sauka 2015; 
Wallace and Latcheva 2006), and the diverse motives of those working in the informal 
economy (Morris and Polese 2014).  
  Few, if any, studies on the informal economy in the context of Central and Eastern 
Europe have until now focused upon the demand-side, examining those who acquire goods 
and services from the informal economy. Little, if anything, is known about the extent to 
which consumers purchase goods and services from the informal economy in Central and 
Eastern Europe, the characteristics of these consumers, or their motives for doing so. The aim 
of this paper, therefore, is to evaluate which consumers in Central and Eastern Europe are 
more likely to acquire goods and services in the informal economy and to start to unravel 
their multifarious motives.   
 To achieve this, the first section will briefly review a range of competing explanations 
for consumers acquiring goods and services in the informal economy. These variously view 
consumers purchasing from the informal economy firstly, as rational economic actors seeking 
a lower price, secondly, social actors doing so for social and/redistributive rationales and 
third and finally, as doing so due to the failures of the formal economy. To evaluate the 
validity of these competing theorizations and to identify the groups more likely to acquire 
goods and services informally for each of these reasons, the second section reports the data 
used, namely an 11-nation survey involving 11,131 face-to-face interviews. The third section 
reports the findings. This will reveal which consumers in Central and Eastern Europe are 
more likely to acquire goods and services in the informal economy, the extent to which each 
of these explanations prevail, and which groups are most likely to state which rationales. The 
final section then seeks to both advance theoretical understandings of the decision to 
purchase goods and services in the informal economy and discusses the policy implications 
of these findings. 
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Before commencing, however, what is meant by the informal economy needs to be 
clarified. The strong consensus among both academics and policy-makers is that the informal 
economy refers to remunerated exchanges that are unregistered by or hidden from the state, 
for tax, social security and/or labour law purposes but are legal in all other respects 
(European Commission 1998, 2007; Grabiner 2000; OECD 2002; Sepulveda and Syrett 2007; 
Williams 2004). If it is not legal in all other respects, it is not defined as the informal 
economy. If the goods or services acquired are illegal for instance (e.g., illegal drugs), then it 
is not part of the informal economy, but the wider criminal economy. It might be of course 
argued that the consumer will not know whether the supplier is declaring the income for tax, 
social security and/or labour law purposes, and thus whether the purchase is taking place in 
the informal economy. However, this is not a problem in this paper. This is because we here 
only examine exchanges where the consumer knowingly engages in, or deliberately initiates, 
the purchase of a good or service in the informal economy.  
 
Explaining the acquisition of goods and services in the informal sector  
 
When examining participation in the informal economy both in Central and Eastern Europe 
and beyond, most literature has until now focused upon the supply-side, analysing those who 
work in the informal economy and developing policies to stem the supply of informal labour 
(Aliyev 2015; European Commission 2007; OECD 2012; Williams 2013). Little attention has 
been paid to the demand-side, analysing who purchases goods and services in the informal 
economy and how this can be tackled. The only known studies are at the level of the 
European Union (EU), and analyse the characteristics of those who purchase goods and 
services from the informal economy (Williams and Martinez 2014a,b) and their rationales for 
doing so (Williams 2008a,b). No known studies have been undertaken of who acquires goods 
and services in the informal economy, and why they do so, in Central and Eastern Europe. To 
start to fill this gap, therefore, we here draw upon these previous EU-level studies to outline 
three possible explanations for consumers in Central and Eastern Europe purchasing goods 
and services in the informal economy.  
   
Lower cost explanation 
A long-standing view has been that participants in the informal economy are rational 
economic actors pursuing financial gain. This derives from the seminal work of Allingham 
and Sandmo (1972) who represent informal workers and consumers as rational actors 
weighing up the rewards and risks of their actions and disobeying the law when the expected 
penalty and probability of detection are smaller than the profits to be gained. Since then, this 
utility maximizing view of the individual pursuing monetary gain has been widely adopted by 
both scholars and policy-makers. Not only are those working in the informal economy 
commonly viewed as rational economic actors doing so for the purpose of financial gain 
(Castells and Portes 1989; Davis 2006; Gallin 2001), but so too are consumers portrayed as 
purchasing goods and services in the informal economy simply because doing so is cheaper 
(Bajada 2002; Fortin et al. 1996).  
 The outcome is that the informal economy has been tacked by altering the cost-benefit 
ratio confronting suppliers and consumers. This has been achieved by concentrating on the 
cost side of the equation. A deterrence approach, adopted by most governments, has sought to 
increase the actual and perceived risks and costs associated with engagement in the informal 
economy by increasing firstly, the perceived or actual likelihood of detection and secondly, 
the penalties and sanctions for those caught (Grabiner 2000; Hasseldine and Li 1999; 
Richardson and Sawyer 2001; Sandford 1999). Recently, nevertheless, other explanations 
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have started to emerge that transcend this depiction of participants in the informal economy 
as rational economic actors motivated solely by monetary gain. 
 
Social motives explanation 
Instead of portraying those engaged in the informal economy as rational economic actors 
influenced by the cost/benefit ratios facing them, a more pro-social representation has 
recently emerged. A small corpus of critical, post-structuralist, post-colonial, post-
development and post-capitalist thought has begun to more widely question the conventional 
³thin´ portrayal of monetary transactions as always purely market-like and profit-motivated. 
Instead, ³thicker´ representations have been adopted which recognize the complex mix of 
logics, including social logics, underpinning monetary transactions (Bourdieu 2001; Escobar 
1995; Gibson-Graham 2006; Leyshon et al. 2003).  
  Applying this to participation in the informal economy, a small literature has begun to 
draw attention to how informal work is often conducted for and by kin, neighbours, friends 
and acquaintances for social reasons rather than for pure market logics (Nelson and Smith 
1999; Smith and Stenning 2006; White and Williams 2010; Williams 2004). Those 
purchasing goods and services in the informal economy are thus viewed more as social actors 
than rational economic actors. For example, they employ kin, friends, neighbours or 
acquaintances to do a task (e.g., a small repair task) so as to give them money (e.g., if the 
supplier is unemployed or short of money) in a way that avoids any connotation that charity 
is involved, which might prevent the recipient from accepting the money (Kempson 1996). 
These informal sector purchases are thus more akin to mutual aid than profit-motivated 
market-like transactions (Williams 2004). As Zelizer (2005) displays, introducing money into 
exchanges does not always depersonalize social interactions and turn them into market 
transactions. This view, therefore, has begun to challenge the view that participants in the 
informal economy are rational economic actors pursuing monetary gain. 
 
Formal economy failure explanation 
A third possible explanation for consumers purchasing goods and services in the informal 
economy is that such exchanges result from the failures of the formal economy. Just as 
informal workers are asserted to have voluntarily exited the formal economy due to the 
problems they witness in working formally, such as registering a business, the high tax levels, 
the demanding of bribes by corrupt state officials and the burden of regulations (Cross and 
Morales 2007; De Soto 1989; Maloney 2004; Small Business Council 2004), a similar 
argument can be made about consumers purchasing from the informal economy. These 
consumers do so due to the failures of the formal economy to deliver goods and services. In 
Central and Eastern Europe, these formal market failings might include firstly, the lack of 
availability and reliability of formal economy businesses (e.g., formal businesses may quite 
simply not exist to do various tasks or if they do exist, be unreliable), secondly, the speed of 
goods and services provision and third and finally, the quality of the goods and services 
provided. Here, therefore, ³the real problem is not so much informality as formality´ (De 
Soto 1989: 255), namely the availability, speed and quality of formal sector provision and 
unless these failings of the formal economy are resolved, consumers will continue to 
purchase in the informal economy.  
 Given that no known studies have evaluated who purchases goods and services from 
the informal sector and their rationales for doing so in Central and Eastern Europe, attention 
now turns to a study that evaluates who does so, why and how the reasons vary across 
populations. In doing so, we will begin to evaluate which, if any, of these contrasting 
explanations are relevant and to which groups in Central and Eastern Europe.  
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Methodology: purchasing from the informal sector in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
To understand who purchases goods and services in the informal economy and how they 
explain this, we here report the results of special Eurobarometer survey no. 402 undertaken in 
2013, which involved 11,131 face-to-face interviews conducted in 11 CEE nations. This 
interviewed adults aged 15 years and older in the national language based on a multi-stage 
random (probability) sampling methodology, with the number of interviews varying from 500 
in smaller countries to 1,500 in larger nations. The methodology ensures that on the issues of 
gender, age, region and locality size, each country as well as each level of sample is 
representative in proportion to its population size. Therefore, for the univariate analysis we 
employed sample weighting, as recommended in both the wider literature (Solon et al. 2013; 
Winship and Radbill 1994) and the Eurobarometer methodology, to obtain meaningful 
descriptive results. For the multivariate analysis however, debate exists over whether a 
weighting scheme should be used (Pfefferman 1993; Solon et al. 2013; Winship and Radbill 
1994). Reflecting the dominant viewpoint, we decided not to use the weighting scheme. 
 The face-to-face interview schedule adopted a gradual approach to the more sensitive 
questions, firstly asking questions about participants¶DWWLWXGHVWRZDUGVWKHLQIRUPDOHFRQRP\
and having established a rapport, questions regarding their purchase of goods and services in 
the informal economy in the last 12 months along with their reasons for doing so and finally, 
questions regarding their supply of informal work. Here, the focus is upon their responses as 
consumers. Participants were first asked ³Have you in the last 12 months paid for any goods 
or services of which you had a good reason to assume that they included undeclared work 
(e.g. because there was no invoice or VAT receipt)?´. If so, they were asked ³What made you 
acquire it from a source involving undeclared income, instead of acquiring it on the open 
market?´ (lower price; faster service; better quality; in order to help someone who is in need 
of money; as a favour amongst friends/relatives/colleagues; good or service is not or hardly 
available on the regular market). 
To analyse first, who is more likely to purchase goods and services from the informal 
sector and second, the individual characteristics of those doing so for different reasons, a logit 
regression analysis was used. The first dependent variable is whether a person purchased 
goods and services from the informal sector in the prior 12 months. The additional dependent 
variables are the various motives for purchasing informally listed below: 
Dependent variables: 
x Lower price rationale ± a dichotomous variable with recorded value 1 for persons 
who answered ³yes´ to the question ³Lower price made you acquire goods or services 
from a source involving undeclared income, instead of acquiring it on the open 
market?´, with recorded value 0 otherwise.  
x Social and/ or redistributive rationale -  a dichotomous variable with recorded value 1 
for persons who answered ³yes´ to the question ³Social and/ or redistributive reasons 
made you acquire goods or services from a source involving undeclared income, 
instead of acquiring it on the open market?´ and with recorded value 0 otherwise. 
x Lack of availability on regular market rationale ± a dichotomous variable with 
recorded value 1 for persons who answered ³yes´ to the question ³Lack of availability 
on regular market made you acquire goods or services from a source involving 
undeclared income, instead of acquiring it on the open market?´ and with recorded 
value 0 otherwise. 
x Faster/ better service on informal market rationale - a dichotomous variable with 
recorded value 1 for persons who answered ³yes´ to the questions ³Faster/better 
service on informal market made you acquire goods or services from a source 
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involving undeclared income, instead of acquiring it on the open market?´ and with 
recorded value 0 otherwise. 
Independent variables: 
x Tax morality: constructed index of self-reported tolerance towards tax non-
compliance, where 1 represents higher tax morale and 10 lower tax morale. The 
reliability CronbDFK¶VDOSKDRIWKHLQGH[LV 0.87. 
x Gender: a dummy variable with value 0 for females and 1 for males. 
x Age: a continuous variable indicating the exact age of a respondent. 
x Marital status: a categorical variable for the marital status of the respondent with 
value 1 for married/remarried individuals or living with partner, value 2 for single 
people, value 3 for those separated or divorced, and value 4 for widowed and for other 
form of marital status. 
x Occupation: a categorical variable grouping respondents by their occupation with 
value 1 for unemployed, value 2 for self-employed, value 3 for managers, value 4 for 
other white collars, value 5 for manual workers, value 6 for house persons, value 7 for 
retired individuals, and value 8 for students. 
x Difficulties paying household bills: a categorical variable for whether the respondent 
has difficulties in paying household bills with value 1 for having difficulties most of 
the time, value 2 for occasionally, and value 3 for almost never/ never. 
x People 15+ years in own household: a categorical variable for people 15+ years in 
respondent`s household (including the respondent) with value 1 for one person, value 
2 for two persons, value 3 for 3 persons, and value 4 for 4 persons or more. 
x Children: a dummy variable for the presence of children up to 14 years old in the 
household with value 0 for individuals with no children and value 1 for those having 
children. 
x Area: a categorical variable for the area where the respondent lives with value 1 for 
rural area or village, value 2 for small or middle sized town, and value 3 for large 
town. 
In order to facilitate the interpretation of the main results of the multivariate analysis and 
better identify variations in consumer motives, predicted probabilities are used to construct a 
³representative´ Central and East European consumer using the mean and modal values 
across the 11 Central and East European nations. This ³representative´ consumer is a retired 
man, 43 years old, (re-) married/living with partner with no children, lives in two persons 
household in a small or middle sized town, which never or almost never confront difficulties 
paying bills. Below, this ³representative´ consumer will be used to analyse and better specify 
the variations in motives driving purchasers into the informal economy.    
 Before examining the results, their reliability needs to be briefly evaluated, especially 
given the sensitive topic involved. The finding is that in 90% of the interviews conducted, the 
interviewers reported good or excellent cooperation from the participant and in 9% of the 
cases the cooperation was average. Cooperation was asserted to be bad in only 1% of cases 
and this poor cooperation was largely in relation to discussing their supply of work in the 
informal economy, not their purchase of goods and services in the informal economy. Given 
this, attention can turn to an analysis of the results. 
 
Results: explaining the acquisition of goods and services from the informal sector 
 
Analysing whether participants in Central and Eastern Europe reported purchasing goods and 
services in the informal economy during the last 12 months, the finding is that 12% reported 
knowingly purchasing goods and services in this manner. Some 1 in 8 respondents, therefore, 
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have acquired goods and services from the informal sector in the past 12 months in Central 
and Eastern Europe. This, however, is not evenly distributed across countries. The propensity 
of participants to purchase in the informal economy ranges from 31% in Latvia to 5% in 
Poland. 
 Why, therefore, do consumers, acquire goods and services in the informal sector? Is it 
in order to pay a lower price? Is it for social or redistributive reasons? Or is it because of the 
failings of the formal economy in terms of the availability, speed and quality of the goods and 
services it provides? Analysing this, Table 1 reveals that the explanation that consumers 
purchase in the informal sector to pay a lower price is the sole motive for doing so in just 
30% of cases, one of several rationales in 39% of cases and not cited as a rationale in the 
remaining 31% of cases. Rationales other than a lower price, therefore, prevail in 69% of 
cases where consumers made purchases in the informal economy. Adopting the rational 
economic actor explanation that consumers do so in order to achieve a lower price, therefore, 
fails to explain the vast majority of purchases in the informal sector. 
  
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Examining the extent to which informal sector purchases are explained in terms of social or 
redistributive rationales, meanwhile, the finding is that social and/or redistributive rationales 
are the sole motive in 8% of all cases and one of several rationales in a further 26% of cases. 
It is similarly the case with formal sector failure. Some 17% of purchases in the informal 
sector are explained solely in terms of poor formal provision and in 34% of all cases poor 
formal provision was cited alongside other rationales.  
 Across Central and Eastern Europe, therefore, the acquisition of goods and services in 
the informal sector cannot be explained using only one of these explanations. Instead, if 
FRQVXPHUV¶PRWLYHVDUHWREHIXOO\H[SODLQHGWKHQDOOWKHVHUDWLRQDOHVQHHGWREHHPSOR\HGIt 
is important to recognize, however, and as Table 1 displays, that when explaining the 
acquisition of goods and services in the informal sector, the weight given to these different 
explanations varies across countries. For example, the rationale of a lower price is more 
prominent in Poland and Lithuania but less common in Slovakia and Romania. Similarly, 
social and/or redistributive motives more prominently explain purchasing from the informal 
sector in Croatia and Slovenia, but this is a less important rationale in Lithuania and Poland, 
whilst poor formal provision is more prominent in Bulgaria, Estonia and Romania but less 
important in Slovakia and Croatia. 
 It is not only across countries that there are variations in the propensity to purchase 
goods and services in the informal sector, and the motives for doing so. Reporting the results 
of a logit regression analysis, Table 2 investigates which types of Central and East European 
citizen display a greater propensity to purchase goods and services on an informal basis and 
which types of citizen are more likely to cite each rationale when explaining why they do so. 
Starting with who is more likely to purchase goods and services in the informal economy, 
model 1 in Table 2 reveals that the propensity to purchase goods and services in the informal 
sector is greater among men, younger people, those with a lower tax morality, and those in 
employment. Moreover, whether they have difficulties in paying the household bills, the 
number of people in the household, whether they have children and whether they live in an 
urban or rural area, has no significant influence on the propensity to purchase from the 
informal sector.    
 Turning to which groups are more likely to cite which motives, model 2 in Table 2 
reveals that consumers more likely to cite the motive of a lower price, and who are thus more 
susceptible to alterations in the FRVWEHQH¿WUDWLRDUH men, younger people, those with a lower 
tax morality, and living in small or middle sized towns. Consumers statistically less 
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susceptible to changes LQ WKH FRVWEHQH¿W UDWLR, meanwhile, are those who never or almost 
never face difficulties paying the household bills. 
 Analysing the consumers more likely to cite social or redistributive rationales, 
meanwhile, model 3 in Table 2 reveals that these tend to have a low tax morality, to live in 
larger households and to never or almost never face with difficulties in paying the household 
bills. Hence, those without financial difficulties are significantly more likely to purchase 
informally for social or redistributive rationales and significantly less likely to do so for 
financial gain. 
 Consumers more likely to acquire goods and services from the informal sector due to 
poor formal provision in the form of the lack of availability of the good or service on the 
regular market are those with higher tax morality and thus only purchase informally because 
of the absence of the good/service on the regular market, and to be divorced, separated or 
widowed/other, and living in larger households (see model 4 in Table 2). Turning to those 
more likely to purchase informally because of the faster or better quality service available on 
informal market, model 5 in Table 2 shows that it is more prevalent among those in formal 
employment than it is among the unemployed, suggesting that they are using the informal 
sector more for greater speed and quality. This might be because formal services are available 
only during working hours or the inability of formal services to tailor provision to exactly 
what they desire. Similarly, those having children are also more likely to purchase for this 
rationale, as are those living in large towns. However, the goodness of fit measures in Table 2 
indicate that for models 3, 4 and 5, there are considerable unexplained factors beyond the 
characteristics considered that appear to affect the customer likelihood of choosing this 
particular motive and thus the results should be cautiously interpreted.   
  Given that model 1 in Table 2 reveals a strong statistically significant association 
between tax morale and the propensity to purchase informally, we here examine how the 
motives of the ³representative´ informal consumer vary according to their level of tax 
morality. 7D[PRUDOLW\LVKHUHYLHZHGDVDPHDVXUHRIWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKFRQVXPHUV¶YDOXHV
norms and beliefs adhere to the codified laws and regulations of the formal institutions 
regarding participation in informal sector (Williams and Horodnic 2015; Williams and 
Shahid 2016). As Figure 1 displays, as tax morale worsens (i.e., 1 represents high tax morale 
and 10 low tax morale), the representative informal consumer living in Central and Eastern 
Europe is more likely to cite the motive of lower price as their rationale for acquiring goods 
and services in the informal sector. It is similarly the case that as tax morale worsens the 
representative informal consumer is also more likely to cite the motive of social and/or 
redistributive reasons or the desire for a faster and/or better service. Those with higher tax 
morale are less likely to cite these as their reason, and more likely to cite the lack of 
availability of the good or service on the regular market as their reason for purchasing 
informally.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
This paper has for the first time evaluated which consumers in Central and Eastern Europe 
are more likely to acquire goods and services in the informal economy, and their multifarious 
motives for doing so. Reporting the results of an 11-country survey, this has revealed that the 
propensity to purchase goods and services in the informal sector is greater among men, 
younger people, those with a lower tax morality, and those in employment. It has also 
revealed that no one explanation for purchasing goods and services informally suffices.  
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 The conventional explanation that consumers purchase in the informal sector to pay a 
lower price is the sole motive for doing so in just 30% of cases, one of several rationales in 
39% of cases and not cited as a rationale in the remaining 31% of cases. Rationales other than 
a lower price, therefore, prevail in 69% of cases where consumers made purchases in the 
informal economy. Social and/or redistributive rationales are the sole motive in 8% of all 
cases and one of several rationales in a further 26% of cases, whilst some 17% of purchases 
in the informal sector are explained solely in terms of poor formal provision and in 34% of all 
cases poor formal provision was cited alongside other rationales.  
 Across Central and Eastern Europe, therefore, the acquisition of goods and services in 
the informal sector cannot be explained using only one of these explanations. Instead, if 
cRQVXPHUV¶ PRWLYHV DUH WR EH IXOO\ H[SODLQHG DOO WKHVH UDWLRQDOHV QHHG WR EH HPSOR\HG
However, different types of Central and East European citizen are more likely to cite 
particular motives. Consumers more likely to cite the motive of a lower price, and thus 
FRQVXPHUVPRUHVXVFHSWLEOHWRDOWHUDWLRQVLQWKHFRVWEHQH¿WUDWLRDUHmen, younger people, 
those with a lower tax morality, and living in small or middle sized towns. Consumers 
VWDWLVWLFDOO\ OHVV VXVFHSWLEOH WR FKDQJHV LQ WKH FRVWEHQH¿W UDWLR PHDQZKLOH DUH WKRVH ZKR
never or almost never face difficulties paying the household bills. Consumers more likely to 
cite social or redistributive rationales, meanwhile, have a low tax morality, live in larger 
households and never or almost never face with difficulties in paying the household bills. As 
might be expected, therefore, those without financial difficulties are significantly more likely 
to purchase informally for social or redistributive rationales and significantly less likely to do 
so for financial gain. Consumers likely to cite poor formal provision include those with 
higher tax morality who appear to purchase informally because of the absence of the 
good/service on the regular market, while those in employment and with children are more 
likely to purchase informally because of the faster or better quality service available on the 
informal market, suggesting that these relatively more affluent groups are using the informal 
sector for expediency and quality rationales.   
 These findings thus have implications for theorising consumer participation in the 
informal economy. They reveal that these are not rival competing explanations which are 
mutually exclusive. Rather, if the propensity to purchase goods and services in the informal 
economy is to be fully explained, then all of these contrasting explanations need to be 
employed. All three explanations are relevant, albeit with their relative importance varying 
socio-spatially with some more important in different contexts than others. Whether similar 
patterns regarding which groups cite which rationales prevail in other contexts could now be 
usefully investigated.  
 These findings also have important policy implications. The conventional approach, 
based on the rational economic actor model, has been to alter the cost/benefit ratio 
confronting participants by concentrating on the cost side and increasing the penalties and 
likelihood of detection (e.g., Grabiner 2000; Hasseldine and Li 1999; Richardson and Sawyer 
2001; Williams 2008a,b). These deterrence measures have been supplemented in recent years 
by policy measures that either increase the benefits of, or provide incentives for, operating in 
the formal economy, including amnesties, voluntary disclosure measures, tax incentives and 
the provision of transition advice and support (European Commission 2007; Small Business 
Council 2004; Williams 2006a,b). The important finding of this study is that such policy 
measures to change the cost/benefit ratios confronting purchasers are unlikely to be 
everywhere and always effective. Purchasers of informal goods and services are not always 
rational economic actors swayed purely by the cost/benefit ratio confronting them. Such 
endeavour also arises due to the shortcomings of formal sector provision in terms of 
availability, speed, reliability and quality, as well as due to consumers pursuing social ends.  
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 To deal with those purchasing goods and services from the informal economy, 
therefore, not only are improvements required in formal goods and services provision but also 
those purchasing for social ends needs to be addressed. Circumventing the shortcomings of 
formal sector provision will require a whole host of initiatives to improve the effectiveness of 
formal sector delivery, including local-level telephone hotlines, web-portals and one-stop 
shops for customers to find formal suppliers and where suppliers can advertise, along with 
the greater use of kite-marks to tackle the issue of reliability and quality. In relation to 
transactions for social ends, meanwhile, whether a ³do nothing´ approach might be adopted, 
whether regulations need to be changed, or whether new institutions are required so that 
citizens can conduct such paid mutual aid legitimately, such as Local Exchange and Trading 
Schemes (LETS) or time banks (Aldridge et al. 2001; Seyfang and Smith 2002), are all issues 
for future evaluation. However, it will also require the development of greater trust of citizens 
in the formal institutions (Williams and Franic 2016; Williams and Horodnic 2015). Given 
the strong statistically significant relationship between low tax morality and consumer 
participation in the informal economy, there is a need to transcend the ³compliance´ 
approach that changes the cost/benefit ratio and move towards a ³commitment´ approach that 
seeks to improve tax morality (Job et al. 2007; Kirchler 2007; Torgler 2007). Measures that 
might be explored include tax education initiatives such as publicity campaigns about the 
benefits of purchasing formally and costs of sourcing informally. 
 Moreover, different policy approaches will be required in different contexts. As 
displayed, changing the cost-benefit calculation will be effective more in those populations 
where the rationale of seeking a lower price is dominant, such as the persons facing 
difficulties in paying bills. As such, the emphasis given to each type of measure will vary 
across populations depending on the configuration of the motives. If this paper thus leads to a 
move beyond simplistic one-dimensional theorizations of consumer motives and towards a 
re-theorization that recognizes the diverse logics and drivers in different populations, then 
this paper will have fulfilled one of its major intentions. If this then leads to greater 
evaluation of how the acquisition of goods and services in the informal sector can be tackled, 
then the fuller intention of this paper will have been achieved.   
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Table 1. Reasons Central and East European consumers purchase goods and/or services in 
the informal economy: by country 
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East-Central Europe 30 8 17 11 19 6 9 
Czech Republic 27 7 15 11 25 4 11 
Estonia 27 9 21 13 21 3 6 
Hungary 27 9 20 12 21 3 8 
Latvia 36 4 17 8 20 6 9 
Lithuania 47 3 16 6 15 5 8 
Poland 59 4 12 10 11 0 4 
Slovakia 17 9 7 17 25 4 21 
Slovenia 19 11 13 14 20 8 15 
Bulgaria 20 6 35 4 24 6 5 
Romania 17 16 21 10 15 15 6 
Croatia 24 11 10 13 20 7 15 
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Table 2. Logistic regression of the odds and reasons for purchasing goods and services in the 
informal economy in Central and Eastern Europe  
 
Purchasing informal goods 
and services (model 1) 
Reasons: 
Lower price 
(model 2) 
Social and/ or redistributive 
reasons (model 3) 
 E  se(E) Exp(E) E  se(E) Exp(E) E  se(E) Exp(E) 
Tax morality 0.219 *** 0.014 1.245 0.174 *** 0.030 1.190 0.051 * 0.028 1.052 
Gender (CG: Female)             
Male 0.321 *** 0.059 1.378 0.199 * 0.114 1.221 0.088  0.113 1.092 
Age (exact age) -0.010 *** 0.003 0.990 -0.010 * 0.006 0.990 0.005  0.006 1.005 
Marital status (CG: (Re-)Married/ Living with partner) 
Single -0.359 *** 0.100 0.698 -0.206  0.189 0.814 0.287  0.189 1.332 
Divorced or separated 0.009  0.112 1.009 -0.052  0.217 0.949 0.270  0.218 1.310 
Widow/other -0.070  0.121 0.932 -0.146  0.223 0.864 0.183  0.224 1.201 
Occupation (CG: Unemployed) 
Self-employed 0.672 *** 0.138 1.959 -0.081  0.259 0.923 0.326  0.262 1.385 
Managers 0.709 *** 0.128 2.032 -0.383  0.243 0.682 0.044  0.251 1.045 
Other white collars 0.302 ** 0.127 1.353 0.146  0.248 1.157 0.145  0.247 1.157 
Manual workers 0.208 * 0.113 1.231 0.262  0.227 1.300 0.146  0.225 1.157 
House persons 0.102  0.167 1.108 0.269  0.339 1.309 0.025  0.334 1.025 
Retired 0.112  0.136 1.118 -0.010  0.270 0.990 0.355  0.273 1.427 
Students 0.207  0.155 1.231 -0.053  0.297 0.949 -0.005  0.298 0.995 
Difficulties paying bills (CG: Most of the time) 
From time to time 0.021  0.088 1.022 -0.167  0.179 0.846 0.242  0.176 1.274 
Almost never/ never -0.083  0.086 0.921 -0.303 * 0.178 0.738 0.334 * 0.177 1.397 
People 15+ years in own household (CG: One) 
Two 0.045  0.098 1.046 -0.057  0.188 0.945 0.121  0.192 1.129 
Three 0.066  0.107 1.068 0.108  0.203 1.114 0.310  0.208 1.364 
Four and more 0.031  0.113 1.031 0.340  0.227 1.405 0.369 * 0.224 1.447 
Children (CG: No children) 
Having children 0.054  0.069 1.055 0.110  0.137 1.116 0.062  0.134 1.064 
Area (CG: Rural area or village) 
Small or middle sized 
town 
-0.007  0.069 0.993 0.227 * 0.134 1.255 -0.117  0.131 0.890 
Large town 0.056  0.072 1.057 0.226  0.140 1.254 -0.290 ** 0.140 0.748 
Constant -2.182 *** 0.219 0.113 0.349  0.428 1.418 -1.716 *** 0.430 0.180 
N 9,361 1,566 1,566 
Pseudo R2 0.0521 0.0492 0.0145 
Log pseudolikelihood -4006.8148 -970.8772 -976.0203 
Ȥ2 430.80 96.95 27.31 
p> 0.0000 0.0000 0.1600 
Notes: 
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (Robust standard errors in parentheses). 
All coefficients are compared to the benchmark category, shown in brackets. 
We kept in the analysis the individuals for which data on each and every independent variable is available. 
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Table 2. Logistic regression of the odds and reasons for purchasing goods and services in the 
informal economy in Central and Eastern Europe - continued 
 Reasons: 
 Lack of availability on regular 
market (model 4) 
Faster/ better service on informal 
market (model 5) 
 E  se(E) Exp(E) E  se(E) Exp(E) 
Tax morality -0.074 * 0.043 0.928 -0.004  0.027 0.996 
Gender (CG: Female)         
Male 0.059  0.163 1.061 -0.172  0.107 0.842 
Age (exact age) 0.010  0.009 1.010 -0.004  0.006 0.996 
Marital status (CG: (Re-)Married/ Living with partner) 
Single 0.137  0.306 1.147 -0.019  0.181 0.981 
Divorced or separated 0.509 * 0.300 1.663 0.100  0.207 1.106 
Widow/other 0.623 ** 0.300 1.864 0.024  0.211 1.025 
Occupation (CG: Unemployed) 
Self-employed 0.339  0.400 1.403 0.460 * 0.252 1.584 
Managers 0.416  0.385 1.515 0.499 ** 0.232 1.648 
Other white collars 0.335  0.383 1.397 0.388 * 0.233 1.474 
Manual workers -0.050  0.353 0.951 0.526 ** 0.212 1.691 
House persons -0.002  0.514 0.998 -0.024  0.315 0.977 
Retired 0.047  0.418 1.048 0.410  0.261 1.506 
Students -0.360  0.492 0.697 0.082  0.280 1.085 
Difficulties paying bills (CG: Most of the time) 
From time to time 0.161  0.266 1.175 0.182  0.163 1.199 
Almost never/ never 0.079  0.273 1.082 0.104  0.164 1.110 
People 15+ years in own household (CG: One) 
Two 0.574 ** 0.280 1.775 -0.041  0.180 0.960 
Three 0.552 * 0.299 1.737 0.001  0.194 1.001 
Four and more 0.735 ** 0.315 2.085 0.148  0.211 1.160 
Children (CG: No children)         
Having children 0.140  0.190 1.151 0.208 * 0.126 1.231 
Area (CG: Rural area or village)         
Small or middle sized town -0.213  0.190 0.808 0.189  0.126 1.208 
Large town -0.327  0.204 0.721 0.292 ** 0.133 1.339 
Constant -3.015 *** 0.607 0.049 -0.737 * 0.402 0.479 
N 1,566 1,566 
Pseudo R2 0.0231 0.0125 
Log pseudolikelihood -537.6933 -1058.2320 
Ȥ2 30.07 25.69 
p> 0.0906 0.2187 
Notes: 
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (Robust standard errors in parentheses). 
All coefficients are compared to the benchmark category, shown in brackets. 
We kept in the analysis the individuals for which data on each and every independent variable is available. 
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Figure 13UHGLFWHGSUREDELOLW\RIUHDVRQVIRUDµUHSUHVHQWDWLYHFRQVXPHU¶SXUFKDVLQJJRRGV
and services in the informal economy in Central and Eastern Europe: by level of tax morality 
(with 95% CI). 
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